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A BSTRACT
We introduce SPLASH units, a class of learnable activation functions shown to simultaneously
improve the accuracy of deep neural networks while also improving their robustness to adversarial
attacks. SPLASH units have both a simple parameterization and maintain the ability to approximate a
wide range of non-linear functions. SPLASH units are: 1) continuous; 2) grounded (f (0) = 0); 3) use
symmetric hinges; and 4) their hinges are placed at fixed locations which are derived from the data
(i.e. no learning required). Compared to nine other learned and fixed activation functions, including
ReLU and its variants, SPLASH units show superior performance across three datasets (MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100) and four architectures (LeNet5, All-CNN, ResNet-20, and Network-inNetwork). Furthermore, we show that SPLASH units significantly increase the robustness of deep
neural networks to adversarial attacks. Our experiments on both black-box and white-box adversarial
attacks show that commonly-used architectures, namely LeNet5, All-CNN, Network-in-Network,
and ResNet-20, can be up to 31% more robust to adversarial attacks by simply using SPLASH units
instead of ReLUs. Finally, we show the benefits of using SPLASH activation functions in bigger
architectures designed for non-trivial datasets such as ImageNet.
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Introduction

Nonlinear activation functions are fundamental for deep neural networks (DNNs). They determine the class of functions
that DNNs can implement and influence their training dynamics, thereby affecting their final performance. For example,
DNNs with rectified linear units (ReLUs) [38] have been shown to perform better than logistic and tanh units in several
scenarios (e.g. [41, 40, 38]). Instead of using a fixed activation function, one can use a parameterized activation
function and learn its parameters to add flexibility to the model. Piecewise linear functions are a reasonable choice
for the parameterization of activation functions [2, 1, 18, 44, 24, 32] due to their straightforward parameterization and
their ability to approximate non-linear functions [15, 51]. However, in the context of deep neural networks, the best
way to parameterize these piecewise linear activation functions is still an open question. Previous piecewise linear
activation functions either sacrifice expressive power for simplicity (i.e. having few parameters) or sacrifice simplicity
for expressive power. While expressive power allows deep neural networks to approximate complicated functions,
simplicity can make optimization easier by adding useful inductive biases and reducing the size of the hypothesis space.
Therefore, we set out to find a parameterized piecewise linear activation function that is as simple as possible while
maintaining the ability to approximate a wide range of functions.
Piecewise linear functions, in the most general form, are real-valued functions defined as S + 1 line segments with
S hinges that denote where one segment ends and the next segment begins. As detailed in Section 3, a function of
this most general form requires 3S + 2 parameters. Many functions in this hypothesis space, such as discontinuous
functions, are unlikely to be useful activation functions. Therefore, we significantly reduce the size of the hypothesis

space while maintaining the ability to approximate a wide range of useful activation functions. We restrict the form
of the piecewise linear function to be continuous and grounded (having an output of zero for an input of zero) with
symmetric and fixed hinges. By doing so, we reduce the number of parameters to S + 1. Furthermore, we still maintain
the ability to approximate almost every successful deep neural network activation function. We call this parameterized
piecewise linear activation function SPLASH (Simple Piecewise Linear and Adaptive with Symmetric Hinges).
Typically, learned activation functions are evaluated in terms of accuracy on a test set. We compare the classification
accuracy of SPLASH units to nine other learned and fixed activation functions and show that SPLASH units consistently
give superior performance. We also perform ablation studies to gain insight into why SPLASH units improve
performance and show that the flexibility of the SPLASH units during training significantly affects the final performance.
In addition, we also evaluate the robustness of SPLASH units to adversarial attacks [53, 16, 39]. When compared to
ReLUs, SPLASH units reduce the success of adversarial attacks by up to 31%, without any modifications to how they
are parameterized or learned.
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Related Work

Variants of ReLUs, such as leaky-ReLUs [36], exponential linear units (ELUs) [7], and scaled exponential linear units
(SELUs) [27] have been shown to improve upon ReLUs. ELUs and SELUs encourage the outputs of the activation
functions to have zero mean while SELUs also encourage the outputs of the activation functions to have unit variance.
Neural architecture search [44] has also discovered novel activation functions, in particular, the Swish activation
function. The Swish activation function is defined as f (x) = x ∗ (1 + e−βx )−1 and performs slightly better than ReLUs.
It is worth mentioning that, in [35], the authors proposed the network-in-network approach where they replace activation
functions in convolutional layers with small multi-layer perceptrons. Theoretically, due to universal approximation
theorem [10], this is the most expressive activation function; however, it requires many more parameters.
Some of the early attempts to learn activation functions in neural networks can be found in [42], [56], and [25], where the
authors proposed learning the best activation function per neuron among a pool of candidate activation functions using
genetic and evolutionary algorithms. Maxout [17] has been introduced as an activation function aimed at enhancing the
model averaging properties of dropout [50]. However, not only is it limited to approximating convex functions, but it
also requires a significant increase in the number of parameters.
APL units [1], P-ReLUs [18] and S-ReLUs [24] are adaptive activation functions from the piecewise linear family
that can mimic both convex and non-convex functions. Of these activation functions, APL units are the most general.
However, they require a parameter for the slope of each line segment as well as for the location of each hinge.
Additionally, APL units give more expressive power to the left half of the input space than to the right half. Furthermore,
the locations of the hinges are randomly assigned, therefore, it is possible that some line segments may go unused.
S-ReLUs also learn the slopes of the line segments and the locations of the hinges, however, the initial locations of the
hinges are determined by the data. S-ReLUs have less expressive power than APL units as the form of the function is
restricted to only have two hinges. P-ReLUs are the simplest of these activation functions with one fixed hinge where
only the slope of one of the line segments is learned. On the other hand, SPLASH units can have few or many hinges
and the locations of the hinges are fixed and derived from the data. Therefore, only the slopes of the line segments
have to be learned. Furthermore, SPLASH units give equal expressive power to the left and the right half of the input
space.

3
3.1

From Piecewise Linear Functions to SPLASH Units
Family of Piecewise Linear Functions

Given S + 1 line segments and S hinges, piecewise linear functions can be parameterized with 2(S + 1) + S = 3S + 2
parameters: one parameter for the slope and one parameter for the y-intercept of each segment, plus S parameters for
the locations of the hinges. We go from the most general case to SPLASH units by reducing the number of parameters
to S + 1 while still being able to approximate a wide range of functions by restricting the activation function to be
continuous and grounded with symmetric and fixed hinges.
Continuous
The general form of piecewise linear functions allows for discontinuous functions. Because virtually all successful
activation functions are continuous, we argue that continuous learnable activation functions will still provide sufficient
flexibility for DNNs. For a continuous piecewise linear function, we need to specify the y-intercept of one segment,
the slopes of the S + 1 segments, as well as the locations of the S hinges, reducing the number of parameters to
2S + 2.
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Table 1: Different types of piecewise linear functions defined on N intervals. The rightmost function is what we use to
parameterize our SPLASH activation functions.

Type

General

Continuous

Continuous
Grounded

# Params

3S + 2

2S + 2

2S + 1

Continuous
Continuous
Grounded
Grounded
Symmetric hinges
Symmetric hinges
Fixed hinges
j k
S + 1 + S2
S+1

Viz

Grounded
Furthermore, we restrict the function to be grounded, that is, having an output of zero for an input of zero. Since the
y-intercept is fixed at zero, we no longer have to specify the y-intercept for any of the segments, reducing the number of
parameters to 2S + 1.
Symmetric Hinges
In our design, we place the hinges in symmetric locations on the positive and negative halves on the x-axis, giving
equal expressive power to each half. This allows, if need be, the activation function to approximate both even and
odd functions. Because the location
of one hinge determines the location of another, we can reduce the number of
j k
S
parameters for the hinges to 2 . In the case of an odd number of hinges, one hinge will be fixed at zero to maintain
j k
symmetry. This reduces the number of parameters to S + 1 + S2
Fixed Hinges
Finally, we address the issue of where to set the exact location of each segment. It is important that each segment has
the potential to influence the output of the function. The distribution of the input could be such that only some of the
segments influence the output while others remain unused. In the worst case, the input could be concentrated on a
single segment, reducing the activation function to just a linear function. To ensure that each segment is able to play
a role in the output of the function, we train our DNNs using batch normalization [23]. At the beginning of training,
batch normalization ensures that, for each batch, the input to the activation function has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. In addition, this facilitates the uniform calibration of the location of the hinges in units of standard
deviations. For instance, placing the hinges at 0, ±1, corresponds to placing them at the origin and at one standard
deviation from the origin. With the location of the hinges fixed, the number of parameters is reduced to S + 1. This
activation function can approximate the vast majority of existing activation functions, such as tanh units, ReLUs, leaky
ReLUs, ELUs, and, with the use of a bias, logistic units. We show the different types of piecewise linear functions that
we have described in Table 1.
3.2 SPLASH Units
We formulate the activation of a hidden unit h as the summation of S + 1 max functions with S symmetric offsets,
where S is an odd number and one of the offsets is zero:
(S+1)/2

h(x) =

X

(S+1)/2

as+ max(0, x

s

−b )+

s=1

X

as− max(0, −x − bs )

(1)

s=1

The first summation contains max functions with a non-zero output starting at x ≥ 0 and continuing to infinity. The
second summation contains max functions with a non-zero output starting at x ≤ 0 and continuing to negative infinity.
When summed together, these max functions form S + 1 continuous and grounded line segments with hinges located
at bs and −bs . To ensure the function has symmetric and fixed hinges, we use the same bs in both summations,
where bs ≥ 0 for all s; furthermore, we have the values of bs remain fixed during training. Since we are using batch
normalization, we fix the positions of the hinges bs for each s to be a predetermined number of standard deviations
3

away from the mean. We ensure there is always one hinge at zero by setting b1 to be zero. The summation of the
Pi
Pi
learned parameters as+ and as− , 1 ai+ or 1 ai− determines the slope of i-th line segment. These parameters are
shared across all units in a layer Therefore, SPLASH units add S + 1 parameters per layer. We study the effect of
different initializations as well as the effect of the number of hinges, S, on training accuracy. From our experiments, we
found that initializing SPLASH units to have the shape of a ReLU and setting S to 7 gave the best results (see Appendix
for additional details).
The following theorem shows that SPLASH units can approximate any non-linear and uniformly continuous function
that has an output of zero for an input of zero in a closed interval of real numbers.
Theorem 3.1 For any function f : [A, B] → R and  ∈ R+ , ∃S ∈ N, where |f (x) − SPLASH(x)| ≤ , assuming:
• A and B are finite real numbers.
• f is uniformly continuous.
Proof: Uniform continuity of f implies that for every  ∈ R+ , ∃δ > 0 such that for every x and y ∈ [A, B] where
|x − y| ≤ δ, then we have |f (x) − f (y)| ≤ . Placing S equally distanced hinges {H1 , ..., HS } on the interval [A, B],
− 1, so the length of each
divides this into S + 1 equal sub-intervals [Hi , Hi+1 ]. We choose S to be greater than B−A
δ
sub-interval would be smaller than δ. For any of the sub-intervals starting at Hi ∈ {H1 , ..., HS }, we approximate f by
B−A
a line segment which connects f (Hi ) to f (Hi + B−A
S+1 ). Due to the linear form of SPLASH(x) for x ∈ [Hi , Hi + S+1 ]:
|f (x) − SPLASH(x)| ≤ max(maxx |f (x) − f (Hi )|, maxx (|f (x) − f (Hi+1 )|)

(2)

f is uniformly continuous, so:
|f (x) − SPLASH(x)| ≤ 

(3)

Now we need to show that SPLASH function (i.e., Equation 1) is able to connect f (Hi ) to f (Hi + B−A
S+1 ) for Hi ∈
{H1 , ..., HS }. We do so by a simple induction as follows: Suppose that f (Hi ) connected to f (Hi+1 ) for i ∈
Pi
Pi
{1, ..., i − 1}. The slope of SPLASH in the sub-interval [Hi−1 , Hi ] are set to be 1 ai+ or 1 ai− (depending on the
Pi+1
Pi+1
sign of the sub-interval). However, the slope of SPLASH in the sub-interval [Hi , Hi+1 ] is either 1 ai+ or 1 ai− .
i+1
In both cases, the extra term ai+1
+ or a− can change the slope to any arbitrary value. This fact plus the assumption of
continuity of SPLASH guarantees that f (Hi ) can be connected to f (Hi+1 ) which was our proposed approximation.
The last thing to mention is that since SPLASH is grounded (SPLASH(0)=0), this approximation by line segments can
only approximate functions f where f (0) = 0.
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Accuracy

4.1 Comparison to Other Activation Functions
In order to demonstrate the benefits provided by SPLASH units in deep learning, we compare them to other wellknown activation functions across several different deep learning architectures and data sets. We train LeNet5 [30],
Network-in-Network [35], All-CNN [49], and ResNet-20 [19], on three different datasets: MNIST [30], CIFAR-10, and
CIFAR-100 [28]. We use batch normalization before each SPLASH layer so the input to the SPLASH layer has a mean
of zero (µ = 0.0) and a standard deviation of one (σ = 1.0). We empirically searched the space of hinge locations and
found that setting S = 7 with hinges at x = 0.0, ±1.0σ, ±2.0σ, ±2.5σ, works well in practice where σ = 1.0 is the
standard deviation of the input distribution. a1+ is initialized to 1 and the remaining slopes are initialized to 0. With this
initialization, the starting shape of a SPLASH unit mimics the shape of a ReLU.
With the exception of the All-CNN architecture, moderate data augmentation is performed as it is explained in [19].
Moderate data augmentation adds horizontally flipped examples of all images to the training set as well as random
translations with a maximum translation of 5 pixels in each dimension. For the All-CNN architecture, we use heavy
data augmentation [49]. More details about the hyperparameters are given in the Appendix.
We compare SPLASH units to ReLUs, leaky-ReLUs, PReLUs, APL units, tanh units, sigmoid units, ELUs, maxout
units with nine features, and Swish units. The hyperparameters for each DNN are tuned using ReLUs and use the same
hyperparameters for each activation function. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 2. We report the average
and the standard deviation of the error rate on the test set across five runs. As reported in Table 2, our implementations
of the architectures mentioned above, using SPLASH activation functions, outperform the original results reported in
the literature for the same architectures with different activation functions [34, 35, 49, 19]. Table 2 also shows that
SPLASH units have the best performance across all datasets and architectures, reducing relative classification error by
up to 10% when compared to ReLUs (see Appendix for additional details on each experiment).
4

Table 2: Results of training four different DNN architectures from the literature. For each architecture, the first row
represents the results of our implementation of the version described in the literature. The second row represents the best
performance of the same architecture when trained using the following nine activation functions: ReLU, leaky-ReLU,
tanh, sigmoid, ELU, maxout with nine features, Swish (β = 0.2), and APL with S = 5. Finally, the last row represents
the results of the same architecture when trained using SPLASH activation functions. In all cases, each architectures is
trained and tested five times. The mean mean and standard deviation are reported, and the corresponding significance
metrics are given in Table 11 in the Appendix.

Activation

MNIST

CIFAR-10

CIFAR-100

-

D-A

30.98±1.14
30.71±0.69
30.14±0.99

23.41±1.31
23.33±0.88
22.93±1.24

Net in Net + ReLU
Net in Net + APL* [1]
Net in Net + SPLASH

9.71±0.69
9.59±0.24
9.21±0.55

All-CNN + ReLU
All-CNN + maxout*
All-CNN + SPLASH
ResNet-20 + ReLU
ResNet-20 + APL*
ResNet-20 + SPLASH

LeNet5 + ReLU
LeNet5 + PReLU*
LeNet5 + SPLASH

1.11±0.09
1.13±0.04
1.03±0.07

-

D-A

8.11±0.81
7.51±0.14
7.29±0.93

36.06±0.84
34.40±0.16
33.91±0.97

32.98±1.10
30.83±0.24
30.32±0.66

9.24±0.48
9.19±0.51
9.02±0.33

7.42±0.59
7.45±0.41
7.18±0.41

34.11±0.79
34.21±0.88
33.14±0.71

32.43±0.73
32.33±0.91
32.06±0.66

10.65±0.55
10.29±0.71
9.98±0.42

8.71±0.51
8.59±0.58
8.18±1.02

34.54±0.88
34.62±0.79
33.97±0.51

32.63±0.67
32.51±0.81
32.12±0.77

4.2 Insights into why SPLASH Units Improve Accuracy
Figure 1 shows how the shape of the SPLASH units change during training for the ResNet-20 architecture. From these
figures, we can see that, during the early stages of training, the SPLASH units have a negative output for a negative
input and a positive output for a positive input. During the later stages of training, SPLASH units have a positive output
for both a negative input and a positive input. SPLASH units look similar to that of a leaky-ReLU during the early
stages of training and look similar to a symmetric function during the later stages of training.
To better understand why SPLASH units lead to better performance, we used the final shape of the SPLASH units as a
fixed activation function to train another ResNet-20 architecture. In Figure 2, we can see that the performance is only as
good as that of ReLUs. This leads us to believe that the evolution of the shape of the SPLASH units during training is
crucial to obtaining improved performance. Since we observed that SPLASH units would first give a negative output
for a negative input and then give a positive output for a negative input, we train ResNet-20 with SPLASH units under
two different conditions: 1) the first slope on the negative half of the input (a1− ) is forced to be only positive, yielding
a negative output for the line segment at zero (SPLASH-negative units) and 2) the first slope on the negative half of
the input (a1− ) is forced to be only negative, yielding a positive output for the line segment at 0 (SPLASH-positive
units).
The performance of SPLASH-positive and SPLASH-negative units is shown in Figure 2. The figure shows that,
although SPLASH-positive units have the ability to mimic the final learned shape of SPLASH units, it performs worse
than SPLASH units and only slightly better than ReLUs. This shows that the ability to give a negative output for a
negative input is crucial for SPLASH units. Furthermore, SPLASH-negative units perform better than SPLASH-positive
units, but still worse than SPLASH units. In addition, we see that SPLASH-negative units exhibit a relatively quick
decrease in the training loss, similar to that of SPLASH units, but do not reach the final training loss of SPLASH
units. These observations suggest that the flexibility of the learnable activation function plays a crucial role in the final
performance.
4.3 Tradeoffs
The benefits of SPLASH units come at the cost of longer training time. The average per epoch training time (in seconds)
and the final accuracy of a variety of fixed and learned activation functions are reported in Table 3. The table shows that
training with SPLASH units can take between 1.2 and 3 times longer, depending on S and the chosen architecture. We
observe that the error does not significantly decrease beyond S = 7. Therefore, we chose S = 7 for our experiments.
While, for many deep learning algorithms, obtaining better performance often comes at the cost of longer training times,
in Section 5, we show that SPLASH units also improve the robustness of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks.
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Figure 1: The shape of the SPLASH units in six different layers of the ResNet-20 architecture during training on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. Each SPLASH layer is placed after a 2D convolution layer and batch normalization layer. In the
early stages of training, the shape of SPLASH units looks visually similar to that of a leaky-ReLU. However, during the
later stages of training, the shape of SPLASH units looks visually similar to that of a symmetric function.

Figure 2: Training loss for ReLUs and different types of SPLASH units for the ResNet-20 architecture on CIFAR-10.
SPLASH units converge faster and also have the lowest final loss. Fixed SPLASH is a fixed activation function that
mimics the final shape of the SPLASH units trained on the ResNet-20 architecture. Fixed SPLASH performs only
about as well as ReLUs. SPLASH-negative units perform better than SPLASH-positive units, however, they perform
worse than SPLASH units. Furthermore, although SPLASH-positive units have the ability to mimic the final shape of
SPLASH units, they perform worse.

5

Robustness to Adversarial Attacks

DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to many types of adversarial attacks [53, 16]. Research suggests that activation
functions are a major cause of this vulnerability [57, 3, 46]. For example, [58] bounded a given activation function
using linear and quadratic functions with adaptive parameters and applied a different activation for each neuron to
make neural networks robust to adversarial attacks. [55] proposed a data-dependent activation function and empirically
showed its robustness to both black-box and gradient-based adversarial attacks. Other studies such as [43], [13], and
[48] focused on other properties of activation functions, such as quantization and pruning, and showed that they can
improve the robustness of DNNs to adversarial examples.
6

Table 3: Per-epoch training time is reported in seconds. The benefits of SPLASH come at the cost of slower training
time. All models are trained using NVIDIA TITAN V GPU with 12036MiB memory and 850MHz. Maxout is trained
with six features and APL is set to have five hinges. For the sake of brevity, T and E are corresponding to per-epoch
training time and error rate respectively.
SPLASH

Activation
S=3

S=5

S=7

S=9

S = 11

Tanh

maxout

ReLU

Swish

APL

MNIST (LeNet5)

T
E

18.1
1.14

20.2
1.10

24.0
1.03

28.5
1.01

31.8
1.05

15.4
1.25

19.4
1.31

12.1
1.11

12.5
1.18

19.3
1.14

CIFAR-10 (LeNet5)

T
E

21.3
30.79

24.7
30.57

29.7
30.20

33.1
30.14

35.4
30.11

19.6
31.14

22.1
31.01

17.2
30.88

17.6
30.69

24.0
30.66

Among all these proposed activation functions, most of them are optimized through an adversarial training task which
is extremely time-consuming and computationally expensive. There are also several studies focusing on designing
activation functions without adversarial training. One of the most successful activation functions designed to improve
adversarial robustness is the Tent activation function [46]. This activation function is designed based on the hypothesis
that adversarial attacks exploit the open space risk of classic monotonic activation functions such as ReLU. The Tent
activation function bounds the open space risk and improves the adversarial robustness of DNNs without the need for
adversarial training.
Also, recently, authors in [59] theoretically showed that DNNs with symmetric activations are less likely to get fooled.
The authors proved that “symmetric units suppress unusual signals of exceptional magnitude which result in robustness
to adversarial fooling and higher expressibility.” This fact can also be seen in the design of the Tent activation function
which is inherently symmetric.
Because SPLASH units are capable of approximating a symmetric function and bounding the open space risk, they may
also be capable of increasing the robustness of DNNs to adversarial attacks. In this section, we show that SPLASH
units greatly improve the robustness of DNNs to adversarial attacks with no adversarial training. This claim is verified
through a wide range of experiments with the CIFAR-10 dataset under both black-box and white-box adversarial
attacks.
An intuition for why a DNN with SPLASH units is more robust than a DNN with ReLUs is provided in Figure 3.
For each of the two networks, we take 100 random samples of frog and ship images and visualize the pre-softmax
representations using the tSNE visualization [37] in Figure 3. The figure shows that the two classes have less overlap
for the DNN with SPLASH units than for the DNN with ReLUs.

Figure 3: tSNE visualization of the pre-softmax layer’s outputs for the LeNet5 architecture trained on CIFAR-10. Left:
Trained with ReLUs. Right: Trained with SPLASH units. Red and black points are 100 random samples from the frog
and ship images of the CIFAR-10 dataset. The figures show that the samples from these two classes are better separated
using the DNN trained with SPLASH units.
5.1 Black-Box Adversarial Attacks
For black-box adversarial attacks, we assume the adversary has no information about the parameters of the DNN. The
adversary can only observe the inputs to the DNN and outputs of the DNN, similar to that of a cryptographic oracle. We
test the robustness of DNNs with SPLASH units using two powerful black box adversarial attacks, namely, the one-pixel
attack and the boundary attack. For each attack, we measure the adversarial robustness using the success rate (i.e. the
7

number of successful attacks). An attack on the pair of input and output (x, y) is considered to be a successful attack,
once the adversarially modified image x0 is classified as y 0 6= y. In other words, for the pair (x, y) where f (x) = y, an
attack is successful if f (x0 = x + ) 6= y, where f (.) is the neural network and  is the adversarial modification. In the
case of a successful adversarial attack, we compre the confidence of the true label to that of the misclassified label.
More precisely, we measure the average of Z(x0 )adversarial_label − Z(x0 )true_label over all adversarial examples where the
network is fooled, where Z(.) is the output of the softmax layer and x0 is the adversarial sample.
5.1.1 One Pixel Attack
A successful one pixel attack was proposed by [52], which is based on differential evolution. Using this technique, we
can iteratively generate adversarial images to try to minimize the confidence of the true class. The process starts with
randomly modifying a few pixels to generate adversarial examples. At each step, several adversarial images are fed to
the DNN and the output of the softmax function is observed. Examples that lowered the confidence of the true class will
be kept to generate the next generation of adversaries. New adversarial images are then generated through mutations.
By repeating these steps for a few iterations, the adversarial modifications generate more and more misleading images.
The last step returns the adversarial modification that reduced the confidence of the true class the most, with the goal
being that a class other than the true class has the highest confidence.
In the following experiment, we modify one, three, and five pixels of images to generate adversarial examples. The
mutation scheme we used for this experiment is as follows:
xl+1
= xlr1 + 0.5(xlr2 + xlr3 )
i

(4)

Where r1 , r2 , and r3 are three non-equal random indices of the modifications at step l. xl+1
will be an element of a
i
new candidate modification.
To evaluate the effect of SPLASH units on the robustness of DNNs, we employ commonly-used architectures, namely,
LeNet5, Network-in-Network, All-CNN, and ResNet-20. Each architecture is trained with ReLUs, APL units, Swish
units, Tent units, and SPLASH units. The results are shown in Table 4 show that SPLASH units significantly improve
robustness to adversarial attacks for all architectures and outperform all other activation functions. In particular, for
LeNet5 and ResNet-20, SPLASH units improve performance over ReLUs by 31% and 28%, respectively. When
adversarial attacks are successful, we found that DNNs with SPLASH units still assign higher confidence to the true
labels of the perturbed images than ReLUs and Swish units. For each model, this measurement is included in Table
4.
5.1.2 Boundary Attack
We use another black-box adversarial attack to further examine the effect SPLASH units have on the robustness of
DNNs to adversarial fooling. Boundary attacks, which were recently introduced by [3], are a powerful and commonly
used black-box adversarial attack. Considering the original pair of input image and the corresponding target as (x, lx ) ,
0
0
the attack algorithm is initialized from an adversarial pair of (x0adv , ladv
), where x0adv ∼ N (0, 1) s.t. ladv
6= lx . Then, a
random walk is performed K times along the boundary between the adversarial region, Sladv |∀x0 ∈ Sladv , lx0 6= lx , and
the region of the true label such that (1) xadv stays in the adversarial region and (2) the distance towards the original
image d(x, xkadv ) is reduced. The random walk uses the following three steps: (1) Draw a random sample µ from an
i.i.d. Gaussian as the direction of the next move. (2) Project the sampled direction onto the sphere centered at x with a
||µk ||2
radius of ||x − xk−1
avd || and take a step of size  = d(x,xk−1 ) in this projected direction. This step guarantees that the
adv

perturbed image gets closer to the original image at each step. (3) Make a move of size δ towards the original image,
where δ =

k
d(x,xk−1
adv )−d(x,xadv )
.
d(x,xk−1
)
adv

Ideally, this algorithm will converge to the adversarial sample xK
adv which is the closest

to the original input x. The details and hyper-parameters of the attack are explained in the Appendix.
In what follows, we employ the same architectures and activation functions that were used in the previous section.
The results of this attack are shown in Table 5. We observe that DNNs with SPLASH units are more robust to this
adversarial attack than DNNs with APL units, ReLUs, Swish, and Tent units.
5.2 White-box Adversarial Attacks
For white-box adversarial attacks, the adversary now has information about the parameters of the DNN. To further
explore the robustness of DNNs with SPLASH units, in this section, we consider two of the popular benchmarks of
white-box adversarial attacks: the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [16] and Carlini and Wagner (CW) attacks [4].
For both attack methods, we consider four different architectures and compare the rate of successful attacks for each of
the networks with ReLUs, Swish units, APL units, Tent units, and SPLASH units. The dataset and architectures are the
same as those used for black-box adversarial attacks.
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Table 4: Robustness to the one-pixel attack using 1000 images, randomly chosen from the correctly classified images
of the CIFAR-10 test set. We attack each architecture five times and report the results in the form of mean±standard
deviation of the number of successful attacks. The maximum number of iterations for all attacks is set to 40. avg(Ztrue −
Zadv ) is computed for the one-pixel attack.
Model
LeNet5

Net in Net

All-CNN

ResNet-20

Activation

one-pixel

three-pixels

five-pixels

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

736±12.3
701±14.2
635±15.9
593±7.4
514±17.2

803±12.7
780±17.4
709±9.8
677±7.4
588±7.4

868±28.9
840±11.0
781±17.7
719±15.9
651±21.7

0.740
0.805
0.465
0.411
0.540

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

644±16.5
670±28.5
521±21.2
491±9.8
449±18.6

701±20.0
715±33.8
661±19.9
588±23.5
530±16.3

769±18.3
760±26.1
703±22.6
649±16.3
599±23.5

0.621
0.419
0.455
0.362
0.311

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

580±17.2
597±23.5
509±25.9
513±21.2
471±18.8

661±15.0
630±33.9
581±21.2
590±21.2
515±25.1

707±25.7
699±34.6
627±24.0
633±24.0
570±24.2

0.366
0.511
0.295
0.223
0.253

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

689±28.2
650±17.7
579±14.4
551±24.3
493±24.3

721±28.2
689±17.0
631±15.7
633±22.9
544±22.9

781±25.3
730±29.7
692±19.4
669±21.2
579±21.2

0.551
0.601
0.290
0.310
0.332

Table 5: Robustness to the boundary attack using 1000 images, randomly chosen from the correctly classified images
of the CIFAR-10 test set. We attack each architecture five times and report the results in the form of mean±standard
deviation of the number of successful attacks.
Model
LeNet5

Net in Net

All-CNN

ResNet-20

Activation

# of successful attacks

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

801±14.4
779±9.2
730±12.0
683±5.4
619±15.8

0.815
0.511
0.541
0.483
0.401

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

766±9.0
759±5.4
654±11.7
632±16.2
598±10.1

0.502
0.391
0.340
0.333
0.351

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

744±9.0
700±16.2
672±6.5
644±11.7
611±11.9

0.621
0.710
0.480
0.399
0.421

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

790±6.4
793±11.3
711±9.2
677±12.0
621±9.4

0.548
0.566
0.471
0.389
0.349

5.2.1 FGSM
FGSM generates an adversarial image x0 from the original image x by maximizing the loss L(x0 , y), where y is the true
label of the image x. This maximization problem is subjected to ||x − x0 ||∞ ≤  where  is considered as the attack
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strength. The loss can be approximated as follows:
L(x0 , y) = L(x, y) + ∇x L(x, y)T .(x − x0 )

(5)

So the adversarial image x0 would be:
x0 = x + .sign(∇x L(x, θ))

(6)

The results for different  are summarized in Table 6. The results show that SPLASH units are almost always better
than all other activation functions with performance improvements of up to 28.5%.
Table 6: Robustness to the FGSM attack using 1000 images, randomly chosen from the correctly classified images of
the CIFAR-10 test set. We attack each architecture five times with random start and report the results in the form of
mean±standard deviation of the number of successful attacks. avg|Ztrue − Zadv | is computed for  = 0.04.
Model
LeNet5

Net in Net

All-CNN

ResNet-20

Activation

 = 0.02

 = 0.04

 = 0.06

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

690±13.5
634±11.1
611±22.5
531±16.6
493±15.1

755±16.6
740±15.7
691±13.4
620±15.7
598±21.4

825±24.1
830±25.7
807±19.0
758±21.7
772±26.7

0.710
0.713
0.419
0.434
0.521

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

590±12.9
577±12.1
531±20.4
524±18.0
498±12.6

651±17.5
619±14.6
607±19.6
586±20.5
554±17.4

798±17.1
750±15.3
719±20.3
711±9.4
689±11.4

0.609
0.439
0.561
0.401
0.499

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

561±10.5
519±12.1
522±18.4
501±17.3
479±11.2

653±18.1
622±17.3
615±8.5
599±16.6
588±14.1

741±24.4
740±16.6
721±21.7
694±12.1
676±19.6

0.590
0.576
0.549
0.303
0.333

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

651±18.1
639±18.4
609±9.4
583±16.6
541±16.4

736±16.1
730±17.3
701±18.0
684±16.6
617±21.7

801±20.7
793±19.7
749±20.5
734±18.4
711±21.0

0.641
0.522
0.303
0.461
0.411

5.2.2 CW-L2
Another white-box adversarial attack, which is generally more powerful than FGSM, was introduced in [4]. For a given
image x and label y, this technique tries to find the minimum perturbation δ, so that the perturbed image x0 is classified
as t 6= y. Using the L2 norm, this perturbation minimization problem can be formulated as follows:
∀t 6= y, min||δ||22 subject to f (x + δ) = t, x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n

(7)

To ease the satisfaction of equality, Equation 7 can be rephrased as min||δ||22 + c.g(x + δ) where g(x) =
max(maxt6=y (logit(x)t − logit(x)y )), c is Lagrange multiplier, and logit(x) is the pre-softmax vector for the input
x.
The robustness performance of ReLUs, Swish units, APL units, Tent units, and SPLASH units for the CW-L2 attack is
shown in Table 7. The table is consistent with previous results as it shows that SPLASH units are the most robust to this
adversarial attack.

6

ImageNet

In this section, we show the benefits of adding the SPLASH activation function to bigger neural networks, such
as those routinely used for the ImageNet [12] benchmark dataset [22, 21, 47, 54]. These neural networks can be
used for instance for object detection, identification, and localization in real world applications, such as autonomous
vehicles. In the following experiments, we show that adding SPLASH units can also improve both the accuracy and
adversarial robustness of MobileNet-V1 [21], MobileNet-V2 [47], and ResNet-18 [19] when trained on the Imagenet
dataset.
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Table 7: Robustness to the CW-L2 attack using 1000 images, randomly chosen from the correctly classified images
of the CIFAR-10 test set. We attack each architecture five times and report the results in the form of mean±standard
deviation of the number of successful attacks.
Model
LeNet5

Net in Net

All-CNN

ResNet-20

Activation

# of successful attacks

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

932±5.5
919±6.4
922±7.5
909±6.1
898±6.4

0.801
0.713
0.609
0.509
0.541

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

916±8.0
919±5.4
915±6.1
899±5.4
892±5.5

0.790
0.724
0.653
0.681
0.674

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

894±13.7
887±8.6
876±12.1
879±15.1
863±11.7

0.611
0.631
0.509
0.419
0.365

ReLU
Swish
APL
Tent
SPLASH

903±11.8
911±15.1
894±11.5
881±11.1
870±12.3

0.603
0.441
0.590
0.499
0.541

Table 8: MobileNet-V1, MobileNet-V2, and ResNet-18 architectures trained on the ImageNet dataset. For each network,
the first row shows the test accuracies obtained with our implementation of the corresponding references. The second
row shows the best accuracies obtained by us by training networks with ReLU, tanh, and Swish activation functions.
The third row shows the test accuracies of the same networks with SPLASH activation functions. Each network is
trained three times and the numbers are shown as mean ± standard deviation.
Top-1

Top-5

MobileNet-V1 + ReLU
MobileNet-V1 + Swish*
MobileNet-V1 + SPLASH

29.53±0.32
29.33±0.48
29.13±0.42

10.58±0.31
10.19±0.33
9.87±0.47

MobileNet-V2 + ReLU6
MobileNet-V2 + Swish*
MobileNet-V2 + SPLASH

29.03±0.61
28.87±0.41
28.44±0.52

9.30±0.44
8.98±0.81
8.61±0.33

ResNet-18 + ReLU
ResNet-18 + Swish*
ResNet-18 + SPLASH

29.12±0.39
28.87±0.32
28.48±0.66

9.91±0.71
9.25±0.58
8.81±0.61

Activation

Table 8 shows that SPLASH units improve our implementation of MobileNet-V1 and MobileNet-V2 by 0.40% and
0.69% in absolute error rate, and 6.2% and 7.4% in relative error rate, respectively. For our implementation of ResNet18, adding SPLASH units also improves the performance by 1.10% in absolute error rate and 11.1% in relative error
rate. To evaluate adversarial robustness, we use FGSM and the CW attack. Table 9 shows that SPLASH units are more
robust to adversarial attacks when compared to ReLUs and Swish units.

7

Conclusion

SPLASH units are simple and flexible parameterized piecewise linear functions that simultaneously improve both the
accuracy and adversarial robustness of DNNs. They accomplish this without the computationally expensive and time
consuming task of adversarial training. They had the best classification accuracy across four different datasets and
six different architectures when compared to nine other learned and fixed activation functions. When investigating
the reason behind their success, we found that the final shape of the learnable SPLASH units did not serve as a good
11

Table 9: Robustness to the white-box attack using 1000 images, randomly chosen from the correctly classified images
of the ImageNet test set. We attack each architecture three times and report the results in the form of mean±standard
deviation of the number of successful attacks.
Model

FGSM

Activation

CW

 = 0.04

 = 0.08

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

avg(Zadv − Ztrue )

MobileNet-V1

ReLU
Swish
SPLASH

526±7.1
533±3.7
488±7.1

683±5.5
671±5.1
622±8.1

0.566
0.590
0.501

948±4.3
953±3.7
921±5.7

0.489
0.391
0.411

MobileNet-V2

ReLU
Swish
SPLASH

514±8.3
520±8.5
481±9.4

661±9.9
658±5.5
611±7.1

0.499
0.504
0.514

918±5.5
914±7.3
907±5.5

0.432
0.414
0.389

ResNet-18

ReLU
Swish
SPLASH

501±3.7
497±5.1
451±8.1

649±5.7
630±9.9
592±8.3

0.603
0.461
0.433

948±3.2
944±4.3
929±1.8

0.573
0.511
0.541

non-learnable (fixed) activation function. Additionally, in our ablation studies, we saw that restricting the flexibility of
the activation function hurts performance, even if the restricted activation function can still mimic the final shape of the
unrestricted SPLASH units. It could be possible that changes in the activation functions play a particular role in shaping
the loss landscape of deep neural networks [20, 11, 6]. Future work will use visualization techniques [8, 14, 33] to
obtain an intuitive understanding of how learnable activation functions affect the optimization process.
Though no adversarial examples are shown during training, SPLASH units still significantly increase the robustness
of DNNs to adversarial attacks. Prior research suggests that the reason for this may be related to their final shape,
which looks visually similar to that of a symmetric function [59]. Given that research has shown that certain activation
functions may make deep neural networks susceptible to adversarial attacks [9], it is possible that adding more inductive
biases aimed at reducing these vulnerabilities may increase the robustness of learned activation functions to adversarial
attacks. Since our ablation studies have shown the importance of having flexible activation functions during training,
these inductive biases may need to allow for flexibility or be applied during the later stages of training, for example, in
the form of a regularization penalty.
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Appendix

9.1 Initialization of SPLASH Weights
In order to optimize the initialization of the SPLASH weights (ai ), we compare the performance of five different LeNet5
architectures trained on CIFAR-10. Each of these architectures uses a different initialization of SPLASH weights.
Figure 4 shows that the leaky ReLU and ReLU initializations perform the best. Leaky ReLU initialization requires us to
determine the slope of the line segment on the left side of the x-axis. Adding another parameter that may need tuning.
Therefore, for simplicity, we use the ReLU initialization (a1+ = 1, and all other slope parameters set to 0) in all of our
experiments.

Figure 4: Left: The loss trajectory of training LeNet5 architecture on CIFAR-10 using different initializations of
SPLASH units. Right: Visualizations of the initializations.
9.2 Number of Hinges
In this section, we perform a variety of experiments to find the best setting for SPLASH activation in terms of both
complexity and performance.
Table 10: Two classification tasks are performed using neural networks with five different numbers of hinges S for
SPLASH activation. For each value of S, train two neural networks with independent SPLASH units and shared
SPLASH units. For each network, the number of additional parameters due to the use of SPLASH and the test error are
shown below. LeNet5 architecture is used for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
S

3

5

7

9

11

Error rate

MNIST
CIFAR-10

1.57-1.61
30.79-30.55

1.33-1.39
30.57-30.29

1.13-1.17
30.20-30.18

1.10-1.08
30.14-30.22

1.12-1.08
30.11-30.19

# of additional params

MNIST
CIFAR-10

12-1408
16- >75k

18-2112
24->120k

24-2816
32->150k

30-3520
40->180k

36-4224
48->225k

First, we assess the effect of S on the performance of SPLASH. Due to Theorem 3.1, using a greater value of S would
increase the expressive power of the SPLASH units, which generally results in better training performance. We tested
different values of S ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11}, with symmetrically fixed hinges at x = 0.0, ±1.0σ, ±2.0σ, ±2.5σ, 3.0σ, and
±3.5σ, starting from 0.0 and progressively spreading out in both directions of the x axis. For instance, when S = 3, we
set the hinges at x = 0.0 and ±1.0. Note that σ = 1.0 because batch normalization is used right before each SPLASH
activation layer. We also use MNIST [31] and CIFAR-10 [29] as training datasets. Each network is trained with two
types of SPLASH activations; 1) A shared SPLASH: a SPLASH unit with the same set of weights among all neurons of
a layer, and 2) An independent SPLASH: a unit with an independent set of parameters for each neuron of a layer. As it
is summarized in Table 10, for the majority of cases with independent SPLASH, there is no improvement in the error
rate of the DNNs. Additionally, the error rates of networks do not significantly decrease for S ≥ 7. Therefore, S = 7 is
a proper choice for the number of hinges. Lastly, based on the experiment explained in Section 4.3, we know that the
training time of a network with SPLASH activation of S ≤ 7 is comparable to the training time of the same network
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with learnable activations such as maxout and exponential activations such as tanh. As one can conclude from both
Table 10 and Table 3, there is a trade-off between the complexity of SPLASH units and the performance of DNNs. We
believe that S = 7 is the best choice for the number of hinges.
9.3

Experiments’ Details and Statistical Significance

In this section, we explain the details of each experiment. Also, to better interpret the results of Table 2, we perform a
t-test [26] on all the error rates achieved in that experiment.
The LeNet5 [30] consists of two convolution layers followed by two MLPs that are connected to a softmax layer. We
use our implementation of LeNet5 with all the hyper-parameters as in [34], except for the number of epochs. We train
all the LeNet5 networks for 100 epochs. All-CNN architecture [49] contains only convolutional layers. Since we could
not reproduce the same top-1 accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset using the hyperparameters specified in the main article,
we used our implementation instead. In this implementation, we use a learning rate of 0.1, with a decay rate of 1e-6, and
a momentum of 0.9. The batch size is set to 64 and we trained these networks for 300 epochs. All other hyperparameters
have the same setting as in [49]. For the ResNet architectures, we use a popular variant, ResNet-20 [19] which has
0.27M parameters. Our implementation of ResNet-20 is taken from [5]. All the hyperparameters including batch size,
number of epochs, weight initializations, learning rate and its decay, and the choice of optimizer are set to the default
values described in [34]. Lastly, for the Net in Net architecture, we use the implementation from [34] with the same
hyperparameters including batch size, weight initialization, learning rate, and the choice of the optimizer.
In Table 11 we also show the p-values associated with the statistical significance of the experiments described in Table
2. Since each number in Table 2 corresponds to the average of five experiments, we are able to perform an independent
one-tailed t-test and provide p-values for each individual experiment. As one can see, all p-values are below 0.1
and most of them are smaller than 0.05 suggesting that the networks trained with SPLASH activation functions are
outperforming all the networks trained with all other activation functions.
Table 11: For each architecture, the best activation among ReLU, leaky-ReLU, PReLU, tanh, sigmoid, ELU, maxout
(nine features), Swish: f (x) = x ∗ (1 + e−βx )−1 corresponding to the minimum average of error rate is selected. Then
the significance of the comparison between each network with the best activation function vs the network with SPLASH
activation is calculated through a t-test. The p-values for each comparison are provided below.

Activation
LeNet5 (PReLU vs SPLASH)
Net in Net(ReLU vs SPLASH)
All-CNN (maxout vs SPLASH)
ResNet-20 (PReLU vs SPLASH)

MNIST

CIFAR-10

CIFAR-100

-

-

D-A

-

D-A

.057

.043
.042
.041
.033

.055
.039
.050
.044

.038
.066
.046

.055
.061
.044

In Section 4.2, we use ResNet-20 architecture to visualize SPLASH shapes at different stages of the training process
in Figure 1. Here we include two more plots showing the evolution of SPLASH units during training. Figure 5 and
Figure 6 are showing the evolution of SPLASH units during training an MLP architecture using MNIST dataset and
LeNet5 architecture using CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively. Both architectures are explained within the caption of the
corresponding figures.
In Section 4.3, we compare the training time of different models with different activation functions. For the models
using the SPLASH units, we use the same setting as described in Section 9.2
In Section 5, we start with a tSNE visualization of 100 random samples of frogs and ships images from the CIFAR-10
test set. The tSNE mapping is performed using a learning rate of 30 and a perplexity of 40. Within the same section, for
the black-box adversarial attack experiments, each network is attacked five times and the reported numbers in Table 4
and Table 5 are the average of the success rate of attacks. One-pixel-attacks are done with the maximum number of
iteration set to be 40 and the pop size of 400. For the boundary attack, we use the implementation in [45]. To reduce the
rate of successful attacks, the step hyper-parameter is set to 6000. All other hyper-parameters are left as the default
from the mentioned implementation. As for the white-box attacks, for both FGSM and CW-L2 attacks, we employ the
implementation and default hyper-parameters in [45]. However, to reduce the success rate for the CW technique, we
use a binary search step of 7 for 1000 steps. The network architectures used for experiments in this section are identical
to the architectures used in Section 4. Lastly, The activation functions use to trained the networks of Section 5 are as
follows: ReLU (y = x for x > 0, 0 otherwise ), APL (S = 5, with fixed hinges on 0, ±1, and ± 2), Swish, SPLASH
(with the configurations mentioned in Section 4) are used. We also use Tent units, which are designed to improve
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Figure 5: The shape of SPLASH activation during training a simple network of MLPs on the MNIST dataset. The MLP
architecture consists of three layers with 256, 128, and 64 neurons. No dropout was employed. The batch size is 64 and
the SGD optimizer is used with momentum 0.9 and learning the fixed learning rate of 0.1.

Figure 6: The shape of SPLASH during training a LeNet5 architecture on the CIFAR-10 dataset. This is the same
architecture used in Section 4.
the adversarial robustness. Tent units can be formulated as y = max(0, δ − |x|) where δ is a learnable parameter,
initialized at 1.0 with no decay during training.
Section 6 is dedicated to the experiments on ImageNet dataset. In our experiments using the MobileNet-V1, we train
the networks with batches of size 32, the initial learning rate of 0.001, and a weight decay of 0.00004. The RMSProp
optimizer with a decay of 0.95 and a momentum of 0.9 is used to optimize the loss function. For the MobileNet-V2
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architecture, we use the implementation from [47]. To train these networks, we use the RMSProp optimizer with decay
and momentum set to 0.9. The weight decay is set to 0.00004. The learning rate is initialized at 0.045 and decays
with a rate of 0.98 per epoch. The batch size is set to 96. All the networks are trained on random crops of size 224
by 224 and the standard color augmentation is performed as explained in [28]. For testing the trained networks, we
use one-crop testing for both top-1 and top-5 error rates. Our implementation and training of the MobileNet-V2, with
ReLU6 activation functions (f (x) = 0 if x ∈ R − [0, 6] else f (x) = x), yields an error rate that is 0.95% higher than
the rate reported is [47]. This could be due to a number of implementation details differences. Nevertheless, within the
consistency provided by our own implementation, the MobileNet-V2 architecture with SPLASH activation functions
outperforms all other MobileNet-V2 architectures using ReLU, tanh, or Swish activation functions. For the ResNet-18
architecture, we followed the same implementation and hyperparameters as in [19]. We use the SGD optimizer with a
momentum of 0.9. The learning rate is initialized at 0.1 and divided by 10 when the error plateaus. We apply the weight
decay of 0.0001 to the convolutional layers only. We use no drop-out and the batch size is set to be 256. The results in
Table 8 show that the SPLASH activation is outperforming ReLU, Swish, and tanh activation functions. For testing, we
use the standard ten-crop method to be able to reproduce the error rates in [19]. We did not use any resizing for the
testing phase as there was no clear guideline for that in [19]. This is most likely the reason for why our implementation
results in a slightly higher error rate than what is reported in [19].
These trained networks with the aforementioned hyperparameters configurations are used in the adversarial attack
experiments. For both the FGSM and CW attacks, we use the same hyperparameter as described in Section 5.
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